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Introduction
Poor countries are and will remain for some time vulnerable to external shocks, be it shocks to export prices or from natural disasters. It is now well documented that the lowest income countries have a higher incidence of shocks than other developing countries and tend to suffer larger damages when shocks occur. For the poorest countries, the annual number of disasters between 1997 and 2001 has been one every 2.5 years. Commodity price shocks are also more severe for poor countries. Low income countries experienced this type of shock on average every 3.3 years. About 26 highly indebted countries have an export concentration of more than 50% in three or fewer commodities, while 62% of the total exports of the least developed countries are unprocessed primary commodities. There has been a secular downward trend for commodity prices for a considerable period of time, and particularly since the 1970s. In addition, short term variability in commodity price can be substantial. Poor countries also rely on climate dependent sectors such as agriculture and tourism for creating output and employment. Low income countries also have relatively more people living in marginal areas that are particularly vulnerable in the event of natural disasters.
Exogenous shocks have significant direct adverse effects on growth and the secondary effects of negative terms of trade shocks can be large. Collier and Sewn show, for a sample of cases where the direct income loss averaged 6.8% of GDP, the total correlated loss of income amounted to about twice that much, to 14% of GDP. The impact is asymmetric: positive price shocks were not found to increase the rate of growth significantly. Research shows that these negative shocks also increase the incidence of poverty. The shocks have significant impact on fiscal and external balances. An IMF study shows that terms of trade shocks and adverse weather conditions have played an important role in creating debt problems
3 . An 11% decline in export earnings in 1999/2000 added 20 percentage points to Uganda's NPV-of-debt-to-export ratio that year.
In theory, the adjustment to a shock should depend on the nature of the shock. It is not the same thing to respond to a permanent and to a transitory shock. In fact, even if a shock is deemed to be transitory, there can be considerable uncertainty about how long it will take to be reversed. Over-optimism concerning the pace of a recovery has been a key factor behind the excessive occurrence of debt by poor countries. If a negative shock is expected to be reversed by a positive shock, it makes sense to finance the bad years out of savings. Poor harvests associated with poor weather can be expected to be matched by good harvest later on. Commodity prices, however, are usually very slow to recover from adverse shocks. This is one of the reasons why it has proven so difficult either to smooth their effect or to stabilize them. Countries that borrow when the prices are low are bound to face financial difficulties before the prices recover their previous levels. Similarly, any attempt to stabilize prices at a given level is bound to fail. Either there is a positive shock and the stabilization Fund becomes so well-endowed that the temptation to expropriate it becomes irresistible, or there is a negative shock and soon the Fund becomes insolvent.
This explains why most people have concluded that not much can or should be done to stabilize commodity prices. Exporting countries, it is then argued, should behave as if any commodity shock was bound to be permanent, and adjust accordingly.
This is too extreme a conclusion. There is no reason why countries should not find ways to protect themselves, if not indefinitely at least temporarily, against adverse shocks. The idea that we develop in this paper builds upon this intuition. Our goal is not to stabilize prices, but to smooth the income of the producers. Countries, we assume, can however get protection against deviation of commodity prices from a moving average of past prices. The reference price upon which the income of the producers is calculated is known in advance to the producers and yet is allowed to follow smoothly market trends.
This avoids the pitfalls of past stabilization that attempted to stabilize around a single price and yet gives countries time to adjust to permanent shocks. The question that we then ask in this paper is: how much would it cost to create a Fund that would protect producers against deviations from a five-year moving average? The answer is twofold.
The worst case scenario, first, is one in which it would cost 2.7 times the (initial) value of the exports that one seeks to protect (on a yearly basis). In average, however, the cost is much less. Over a period of 50 years, we simulate that the median cost would be worth about six months of exports.
There are clearly many ways by which the ideas involved in this mechanism could be applied. One is indeed to create a Fund in which producers would be free to participate and which would be endowed accordingly. Another would be to modulate traditional ODA according to the moving average idea that we propose. Commodity exporters would receive ODA that would vary inversely with deviations of commodity prices from past averages. Our computation would then help donors assess what is the extra cost to proceed along the lines that we suggest.
In what follows, we first explain how we calibrate our results and then proceed to a few simulations of their sensitivity to various parameters. Finally, we turn to policy implications.
Empirical Investigation
\
We seek to analyze how a stabilization agency could guarantee a price t p * to an exporting country, where t p * is a moving average of the price at time t and its previous values
, in which h is the time horizon over which the average is taken and d is the delay between the spot and the moving average.
The stabilization is done through a Fund, which is initially endowed with an amount 0 0 F > in period t>0. The quantity exported by the country is normalized to unity.
Subsequently, for t>1, the Fund evolves according to the following rule:
The real interest rate r is assumed to be constant over time. The aim of this paper is to determine the probability of depletion of the Fund and to investigate how much resources are needed to avoid (with various degrees of probability) its bankruptcy.
In order to calibrate our results, we use monthly commodity price data reported in the Figures 1 to 4 plot monthly spot prices, along with monthly moving averages over 2, 5 and 10 years, with an initial lag of 1 year (in other words, {24, 60, 120} n ∈ and 12 d = ). With the exception of bananas, one striking feature of price movements is that the peaks would appear to be more accentuated than the troughs, a feature that is analyzed in Deaton and Laroque 
Statistical model
We compute tests to fit a statistical model for each of the price series. We restrict ourselves to ARMA models for the price series, either stationary around a linear trend, or difference- 
The zero-mean stationary term, t e , is given by a standard ARMA process: Following the Box-Jenkins methodology, we first test whether the price series are trend stationary (TS) or difference stationary (DS), i.e. whether they are best represented by (1) 
ARMA fit
Having chosen between TS and DS models, we then remove the deterministic parts:
for model (1), β for model (2). This is done by running OLS on either equation. This gives unbiased mean estimates for β (and possibly µ ); however the estimated standard errors are wrong (see section 3 for a discussion). This is not a serious problem, given our objectives, so we do not correct for this. The estimated deterministic part is then subtracted from the original T Table 3 gives the results of the computations. It reports the type of model used (TS or DS), the number of observations, the (monthly) logarithmic deterministic trend (with the associated standard error), the AR and MA orders selected, and finally the Box-Pierce Q(24) statistic 6 and the associated p-value.
The only significant negative trend is for bananas (about -0.75% each year), but given the previous discussion on standard error estimates, this result should not be taken into account.
( 
Simulating the Fund
The statistical models we have fitted now enable us to simulate the behavior of the commodity prices (using Monte-Carlo simulations), and therefore the behavior of the stabilization fund. We have tried to make these simulations as insensitive as possible to initial 5 Using function arima0() of the R stats package. 6 It has a chi-square distribution with 24 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from order one to 24 in the residuals of the estimated models.
conditions, since they seem to play an important role. One point should be noted regarding time intervals: the models fitted for price series are monthly ones, but it seems more sensible to simulate the fund with a one-year periodicity. Put another way, the t stands for months in equations (1) and (2), while it stands for years in our simulations. To solve this, we have simulated the price series on a monthly basis, and then extracted data for the month of July in order to get yearly data. In the following, all given times will be in years.
One important point should be noted. All results are expressed as a proportion of the value of output that the Fund seeks to stabilize. As Fally (2004) demonstrates theoretically, one should not seek to protect the entirety of the producers' income. Indeed, in that case, the scheme would be open to manipulation. In year t for instance the producers could reduce production so as to let prices go up and then in year t+1 flood the market at the stabilized price. If instead they receive a protection for only the first x tons of their output, then the incentive to manipulate prices disappear.
There are many parameters which can be adjusted for the simulations. The most important are n (the number of years over which the moving average is calculated), r (the yearly interest rate) and 0 F (the initial endowment of the fund). Others include d (the initial delay in the MA), and h (the time horizon over which the simulation is done). In the following, we will assume that d=1 and h=50, which means that the simulations will have a 50-year horizon.
For each commodity, and for a given set of parameters, we have done 100,000 MonteCarlo simulations, assuming a Gaussian distribution for the innovations of the price processes.
For TS models, no initial conditions need be given. For DS models, which are by definition only specified in differences, 0 p was set equal to the real value of July 2003. Table 4 reports our key results, for a given set of parameters. We explore in appendix 1, the sensitivity of our results to these parameters. For example, the line for cocoa refers to price stabilization for cocoa beans. With an initial endowment of 1.8 times the annual value of trade (7.5 bn. 2003 US$), the fund will remain always positive with 90% probability. With an initial endowment worth 2.6 times the volume of trade, the fund will never become negative, even at an infinite time horizon. This is in fact a general statistical property: it never takes more than 2.68 times the flows of trade volume to stabilize commodities along the lines of our proposal. The intuition is in fact quite simple. The worst case scenario is one in which the price of the commodity collapses to zero indefinitely. In that case the fund has to pay the exporters one full year of exports during the first year, then 0.75, then 0.5 then 0.25 then nothing. That makes 2.5 years, given the interest on the Fund borrowed, that makes a bit more. Clearly, however, the numbers in table 4 are worst case scenarios. In average, the Fund is much less costly. Downs and up usually alternate, around the moving average, so that the Fund do recapture sometimes part of the transfers. We simulated the median cost of the Fund, when it is allowed to run for a period of 50 years. The results are shown in table 5 below. In the case of Cocoa, the cost would actually be negative: in average one would gain at offering this scheme to exporters. In the other cases, Bananas would cost, in the median case, one quarter of the exports, in the case of cotton and rice about 6 months. Sensitivity analysis are presented in appendix over the choice of the parameters.
Key results
Other options
We also have tested two alternative options. One is the cost of a Fund which would pool all five commodities together. In the case of a 90% scenario, and for a five-year moving average, we find a cost corresponding to 0.88 times the volume of trade to be insured. This is quite significantly less than the amounts obtained for each individual fund, which varied from 1.12 to 1.75 times the trade flows. This shows that there would be some merit to form a mega Fund rather than individual ones.
We have also tested how large a fund of resources would be needed to stabilise commodities on an asymmetric basis, that is: how much would it cost to transfer resources in case of a bad shock but not to collect them in case of a positive one. We only present the results for the 90% case. We see that the asymmetrical scheme is much more expensive than the symmetric one. In the case of cocoa, for instance, the Fund would need to contain more than 6 times the flows to be insured, while, under the symmetric case, the amount was only 1.81 times the volume to be insured.
Policy implications
Debt
Because poor countries remain afflicted by exogenous shocks, everyone agrees on the need to find flexible instruments to address contingencies. There is a wide array of institutions and issues implicated in this problem. The relevant institutions -whether IDA or the IMF or other members of the international donor community could respond to destabilizing commodity price shocks to low-income countries (LICs) by evening out revenue spikes with contingency financing facilities. The HIPC Initiative's post-completion point "topping up" facility is, in part, a recognition that LICs are highly prone to exogenous contingencies and therefore in need of compensatory arrangements. Currently, LIC government finances absorb alone the risks and shocks associated with a range of economic, geopolitical, epidemiological and climatic uncertainties.
One could also think of creating new debt instruments that explicitly take account of exogenous risks. This would gear debt service directly to commodity prices and index the debt service profile to a commodity price index, such that commodity price declines could trigger postponement or adjustment in debt service. In September 1999, the World Bank introduced risk management products linked to its loan exposure. These hedging products are:
interest rate swaps, caps and collars; currency swaps; and commodity price-linked swaps. The
Bank decided not to offer specific commodity-based loans at that time because it would have been difficult to undertake the commodity-based funding and liability management to match the disbursement periods of Bank loans while managing associated risks. Our computations could serve as a basis for delivering such commodity-based loans.
Our approach allows one to measure what should be the endowments needed to make these funds operational. One idea would be to set up a Fund aimed at evening the payments made by the debtors. If the average repayment is R every years then one could draw of the Collier and Dehn conclude with the suggestion that ODA should do the job of protecting the country against adverse commodity shocks. The EU has also long recognized the need to protect ACP countries from vulnerability to external shocks. Again, our numbers suggest
ways to compute what it would cost to implement these ideas.
Conclusion
We have presented a scheme which could be used in a variety of fashions: either directly to help producers protect themselves against adverse shocks, or to calibrate ODA to a government to dampen the impacts of price volatility on GDP. The scheme could also help tailor new loans to commodity dependent countries, smoothing their repayment pattern accordingly. The orders of magnitude that we present should give some indication of the costs of provisioning a revenue smoothing mechanism. 
